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Abstract 
This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the effects of alternative solutions to a 
common-pool resource with a unidirectional flow. The focus is on the comparative economic 
efficiency of communications, bilateral “Coasian” bargaining, auctions and price-based 
allocations. All treatments improve allocative efficiency relative to a baseline environment.  
Communication and bilateral bargaining are not generally as effective as market allocations.  An 
exogenously imposed, optimal fee results in the greatest efficiency gain, followed by auction 
allocations that determine the usage fee endogenously. 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 The standard solution to the tragedy of the commons is to assign broad-based property 
rights, thereby internalizing the externality.  Subsequent purchases and sales can then reallocate 
these rights to efficient producers.  When property rights are difficult to enforce or when their 
assignment is politically infeasible, a host of direct regulations may arise. The path-breaking 
work of Elinor Ostrom and her coauthors has uncovered a rich variety of institutional solutions, 
most of which do not involve property right assignments or heavy-handed regulation.1   
A particularly interesting common-pool resource problem arises when resource 
availability follows a unidirectional flow, such that usage by upstream producers only imposes 
externalities on those farther downstream.  An example is the situation of farmers aligned along a 
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canal, who make sequential use of the scarce water resource to irrigate their fields.2  Even with 
well defined property rights, overuse by upstream farmers may prevent water from reaching 
fertile downstream areas.3  In such cases, market-based solutions may offer some advantages: 
e.g., marketable shares of water flow provide farmers with incentives to trade in such a way that 
water is diverted to its highest-value uses (Yoder, 1986).  Social solutions may also exist.  For 
example, opportunities for efficient coordination of canal repairs or joint marketing may put 
property owners in social settings where they are in a better position to negotiate mutual 
reductions (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993).  
The first laboratory experiments on this topic are reported by Gardner, Ostrom, and 
Walker (1990), who provide a conceptual framework for evaluating problems associated with 
overuse of a common-pool resource.  In these experiments, subjects simultaneously select the 
intensity of their harvest from a common-pool resource by allocating “tokens” between two 
activities.  Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom (1990) consider the effects of changing the endowment 
of tokens.  Cardenas, Janssen and Bousquet (2008) introduce a water irrigation experiment: the 
first attempt to investigate sequential extraction of a common-pool resource, in contrast to 
simultaneous request. 
Experiments that include simultaneous provision and sequential appropriation of water 
resources suggest that the lack of trust from downstream players towards upstream players curbs 
cooperation.4 Social pressures may result in some improvements, especially for small groups of 
economically or ethnically homogeneous users.5  In experimental work where the requests for 
appropriations are made sequentially, but distribution occurs at the conclusion of the decision 
sequence, individual requests and position sequence are negatively correlated.6 Late movers 
request less and early movers request more, regardless of the information conditions and the 
                                                          
2  Other examples of directional flows include pollution that is blown by prevailing winds, and the harvest of 
migratory fish. 
3  Ostrom and Gardner (1993) report an example from Nepal in which overuse by “headlanders” during the pre-
monsoon season results in crop values that are much lower than what could be achieved with a reallocation to 
downstream rice farmers. 
4  Cardenas, Johnson and Rodrigues (2009) conducted both a “water irrigation” experiment and a “water trust” 
experiment.  
5  Cardenas (2003) and Cardenas et al. (2002) report field experiments in which non-homogeneous groups have more 
difficulty in dealing with common-pool resource problems. 
6 Budescu et al. (1997) considered information manipulations on the effect of having a sequence of extraction 
requests from a shared common-pool resource. 
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randomness of order assignment. 
In some cases, informal social arrangements at a local level seem to outperform 
regulations imposed by a higher government authority.7  However, the sequential structure of 
unidirectional externalities can create problems.  For example, let sequential locations along a 
canal be represented by users 1, 2, and 3, so that user 1 acts first, user 2 acts second, etc. User 3 
could pay user 1 to reduce water usage, but this private arrangement will be of little benefit to 3 if 
user 2 exploits the extra water flow when given the move.  In a long sequence of usage decisions, 
“defection” by a single upstream user, if observed or incorrectly inferred, may induce a cascade 
of downstream defections.  Efforts to impose use limits or fees may be hampered by misleading 
information provided to regulators or by offsetting activities taken by the users.8
This paper describes a laboratory experiment designed to evaluate the efficiency gains 
provided by four potential solutions to a sequential common-pool appropriation problem: 
communication (“chat”), bilateral bargaining with chat (“bargaining”), an auction of water rights 
(“auction”), and an optimal irrigation fee (“optimal fee”).  A between-subjects design is used to 
compare the allocative efficiencies of these potential solutions.  Section II describes the general 
game and specific treatment environments in detail.  Section III explores results of the 
experiment, specifically subject behavior and observed efficiency in each environment.  Section 
IV concludes with a discussion of observed themes and potential extensions. 
II. Procedures 
Participants in this experiment are given the role of “farmers” located along a common 
“canal” that flows by each of their farms in sequence.  Each session consists of 6 participants, 
with numbered addresses corresponding to their identities (IDs 1-6).  Addresses determine the 
sequence in which water use decisions are made: ID 1 moves first, ID 2 moves second, etc.  
Address locations do not change between the rounds. 
Each participant is endowed with 4 fields of randomly determined productivities.  The 
productivity value for a given field corresponds to the cash value of the crops that field yields in 
                                                          
7  Cardenas, Stranlund, and Willis (2000) conducted a field experiment in rural villages in Columbia. They find the 
application of rules and regulations that are imperfectly monitored and outside of informal community institutions 
tend to increase selfish, individualistic behavior—resulting in overuse. 
8  In fisheries, for example, limits on the season result in larger boats.  For an irrigation system, limits on pipe size 
may result in the use of more powerful pumps, etc.  There is a saying in Spanish: “el que hace la regla, hace la 
trampa” (he who makes the rule, makes the trick). 
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the absence of irrigation.  If irrigated, a field yields a cash value of triple its productivity value.  
Provided water is available, each participant decides whether or not to irrigate each field.  A total 
stock of 12 “units” of water is available in each round; irrigating a field is a binary decision that 
depletes a “unit” of water from the total available stock.  When deciding whether to irrigate each 
field, the available amount of water is visible to the participant, but the amounts taken by 
upstream user are not visible (except in specific treatments, as noted below).  
Rounds correspond to different growing seasons with renewed water supplies.  To reflect 
local climate variations, productivities are randomly generated from discrete-uniform 
distributions in each round.  All sessions are run with web-based Veconlab software, using the 
Water Externalities program.9  Rich terminology (farmers, fields, water) is used to help make the 
decision-making context clear to the participants.  The same context is used in all treatments. 
Table 1 displays the ranges of random field-productivity values, which differed between 
the three upstream producers (IDs 1-3) and the three downstream producers (IDs 4-6).  Both 
productivity ranges and their realizations in each round were private information.  Distributed as 
discrete-uniform random variables, productivities are constrained to be integer amounts: e.g. 
high-productivity fields are equally likely to have values of $7, $8, $9, $10, or $11, and low-
productivity fields are equally likely to have values of $2, $3, $4, $5, or $6. 
 
Table 1. Fields and Ranges of Base Productivity Values (Tripled with Irrigation) 
Field 
Number 
Upstream Producers 
(IDs 1-3) 
Downstream Producers 
(IDs 4-6) 
1st $7-$11 $7-$11 
2nd $2-$6 $7-$11 
3rd $2-$6 $7-$11 
4th $2-$6 $2-$6 
 
The optimal allocation of the 12 water units is to irrigate the 12 high-productivity fields.  
Since the productivity ranges for the two types of fields do not overlap, this corresponds to 
                                                          
9  The program is available online at http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/admin.php for instructor setup and at 
http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/login.php for participant login.  Setup options are flexible in terms of the numbers 
of participants, the numbers of fields and the ranges of their random productivity draws, the possibility of random 
changes in the water stock, etc.  Instructions for participants are configured automatically to match the selected 
setup.  These instructions are presented to participants prior to the first round and prior to the round following a 
treatment change.  This program can also be used in a classroom setting to induce discussions of common-pool 
resource problems. 
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allocating 1 unit of water to each of the upstream producers (IDs 1-3), and allocating the 
remainder evenly over the downstream producers (IDs 4-6).  If upstream producers behave 
selfishly, they will each take 4 water units, leaving no available stock for the downstream 
producers with more high-productivity fields.  Since irrigation triples yield values, the net gain 
from irrigation is twice the yield value.  Notice that an optimal fee is a price for water of $13, 
which would deter farmers from irrigating low productivity fields, but would not deter those with 
high productivity fields.  The imposition of an optimal fee, in theory, would yield maximum 
earnings (100% efficiency), as compared with the approximate 75% efficiency that would result 
from purely selfish behavior under these parameter values.     
A baseline environment as just described is used for the first three rounds of each session.  
In the final three rounds, one of five different treatments is applied:  a repeat of the baseline (no 
change), communication (“chat”), bilateral bargaining with chat (“bargaining”), an auction of 
water rights (“auction”), or an optimal irrigation fee (“optimal fee”).  Repeating the baseline 
environment allows the experimenter to obtain a basis for comparison that is corrected for 
experience. 
In the chat treatment, participants are given three minutes to communicate in an online 
chat room.  After the chat period ends, they made decisions in sequence as before, except that 
each person is able to view the water use decisions of upstream participants by ID.  There is, of 
course, a large literature on the effects of communication in common-pool resource dilemmas.  
The purpose of this treatment is to determine how a controlled amount of social interaction might 
enhance efficiency in this sequential setup, in order to provide a basis for comparison with 
market-based policies to be discussed next. 
Like the communication treatment, the bargaining treatment also involves a chat room 
and public decision making.  The chat time is extended to 6 minutes in each round to provide 
participants sufficient time to negotiate binding bilateral contracts.  Two types of contracts are 
possible: (1) an offer to pay an upstream user to their restrict irrigation to at most Q units in 
exchange for a payment of $P, and (2) an offer to accept $P from a downstream user in exchange 
for agreeing to restrict one’s own irrigation to at most Q units.  Anyone who receives a proposed 
contract can accept it or not.  All agreements are bilateral and binding, but participants can make 
agreements with any number of upstream and downstream users.  For example, ID 1 might agree 
to restrict irrigation to 3 units in exchange for payment of $2 from ID 4, and the same person (ID 
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1) might agree to restrict irrigation to 2 units in exchange for a payment of $10 from ID 5.  In this 
case, ID 1 would receive a total of $12 and would be limited to use at most 2 units of water.   
This treatment is motivated by the Coase theorem, which suggests that bargaining under 
the umbrella of well-defined property rights should result in an efficient allocation even in the 
presence of externalities, as long as certain assumptions are satisfied (Coase, 1960).  The most 
critical assumption is the absence of transactions costs.  Although, there are no explicit 
bargaining costs in the experiment, time limits and the need to engage in multiple, interrelated 
negotiations may generate substantial indirect transactions costs.  Participants are also hampered 
in terms of not knowing others’ productivity values when negotiating contracts.   
In the auction treatment, a permit is required to irrigate a field.  All farmers, regardless of 
address, have the opportunity to bid for as many as 4 permits each. The highest 12 bids are 
selected, and the price paid for the permit is the highest rejected bid (i.e. the 13th bid).  This is a 
multi-unit, uniform-price auction with private values, so it is never optimal to bid above one’s 
value.10  Bidding below value at the rejection margin could, however, reduce the price paid for 
other permits.  Therefore, bidding at value is not necessarily an equilibrium strategy, as would be 
the case in a second-price auction with a single prize.  If bids do mirror values, then an auction 
would select the high-value users; the resulting allocation would be efficient, and the clearing 
price would constitute an optimal usage fee.  The purpose of the auction treatment is to determine 
how effectively a market process could approximate an optimal fee. 
In contrast to endogenous determination of the fee in the auction treatment, the optimal 
fee treatment simply imposed an exogenous per-unit fee of $13 for each water unit used, 
simulating a Pigouvian tax.  The revenue from the fee is not returned to the participants.11  No 
chat was allowed in the auction and optimal fee treatments. 
Reported results are based on a total of 25 six-person sessions, run between March and 
December 2009, using student subjects recruited from the University of Virginia.  Session lasted 
from 35 to 60 minutes, depending on the treatment.  Participants received $6 for showing up, and 
were paid a cash amount equal to 4% of the money they earned in the experiment.  Earnings 
                                                          
10  This setup is similar to the multi-unit uniform-price auction was implemented by the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) for the sale of allowances for Carbon Dioxide emissions from electric power generators in 10 
northeast states. Laboratory experiments were used to refine recommended auction procedures (Holt, et al., 2007 and 
Burtraw, et al., 2009).   
11  We also ran 5 sessions in which the treatment involved an optimal fee, but in which the fee revenues were equally 
divided among the farmers.  This treatment is not reported, since the results are quite similar to the optimal fee 
treatment with no rebate. 
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depended on the treatment, but generally ranged from $12 to $30, including the initial $6 
payment. 
III. Results 
In every environment of the experiment, there exists a unique optimal allocation in which 
water is used to irrigate the 12 most productive fields. Data from this experiment are used to 
calculate efficiencies as a percentage of this optimal allocation.  Efficiencies by round are shown 
in Figure 1, where each line represents an average over all 5 sessions for a specific environment.  
The dashed gray line, which lies below the others, tracks the predicted efficiency for the case 
where all water is taken by the three upstream farmers.  Note that these “selfish” predictions are 
at about 75% efficiency, with some slight variability due to random productivity draws.  The 
legend labels on the right indicate the treatment used in rounds 4-6.   
 
Treatment in Rounds 4 - 6:
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
1 2 3 4 5 6
Round
Efficiency
% Optimal Fee
Auction
Bargaining
Chat
Baseline
Selfish
 
Figure 1.  Baseline Efficiencies (Rounds 1-3) by Session and Treatment 
 
The highest efficiencies are observed when an optimal fee is exogenously imposed, 
followed by an auction.  Bargaining and chat are less efficient, and exhibit little difference.  
Under baseline conditions, average efficiencies are 1 to 3 percentage points higher than the 
purely selfish predictions, indicating a small amount of altruistic behavior.  Recall that in this 
environment, the unidirectional flow of water and static location of participants means that acts 
of generosity cannot be reciprocated. 
Average efficiencies, disaggregated by session, are arrayed in Figure 2 for the baseline 
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environment (rounds 1-3), and in Figure 3 for the treatment environments (rounds 4-6).  The 
order of sessions from left to right in Figure 2 matches that in Figure 3.  Notice that there are 5 
bars in each treatment cluster, each representing the average efficiency in a session-environment. 
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Figure 2.  Baseline Efficiencies (Rounds 1-3) by Session and Treatment 
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Figure 3.  Treatment Efficiencies (Rounds 4-6) by Session and Treatment 
 
A quick glance at these data affords several qualitative observations.  Despite some 
variability, efficiencies in the baseline environment look basically homogeneous across 
experimental sessions.  There is no correlation between baseline efficiencies and treatment 
efficiencies, except in the bargaining sessions, where efficiencies are increasing from left to right 
in both figures.  Efficiencies vary considerably both within and across treatments.  For example, 
the minimum efficiency in the Optimal Fee treatment is greater than the maximum efficiency in 
any other treatment environment.  While it is tempting to declare that observed efficiencies admit 
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a monotone ordering by treatment, the variability of efficiencies in the Chat treatment suggests 
the need for more analysis. 
Reading too much into patterns based on limited numbers of observations is always 
dangerous, and the prudent question is whether observed relationships can be explained as more 
than chance variation.  The remainder of this section discusses what inferences these data provide 
about the relative merits of the considered solutions to a common-pool resource problem with 
sequential extraction. 
 
Result 1:  Average efficiency in the baseline environment is slightly greater than would be 
expected under purely selfish behavior. 
 
The selfish prediction for this experiment has the first three farmers consuming four units 
of water each, leaving no residual irrigation for the downstream farmers who have more 
productive fields.  Across the baseline environment (rounds 1-3) this allocation corresponds to an 
average “selfish efficiency” of 74.33%.  Casual inspection of Figures 1-3 suggests that observed 
efficiencies are slightly greater than the selfish prediction. This conclusion is supported by 
statistical inference, as we are firmly able to reject the claim that the average baseline efficiency 
(pooled over all 25 sessions) equals the selfish prediction at any reasonable level of 
significance.12
Of course, rejection of equality does not imply a large inequality, and a 10% confidence 
interval places the average baseline efficiency only between 76.1 and 78.0%.13  Thus, while we 
are confident that average baseline environment efficiency exceeds the selfish prediction, the 
difference is evidently small. 
 
Result 2:  All non-baseline treatment environments provide efficiency gains over the baseline 
environment. 
  
Every potential solution to the common-pool resource problem studied in this paper is 
                                                          
12  Student's t-test provides a p-values of less than 0.0001. 
13  Interval constructed by the usual inversion of the t test. 
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meant to improve upon the efficiency of the status quo baseline environment.  To test the merits 
of each solution, we explore within-session efficiency gains between baseline and treatment 
environments.  This amounts to calculating the difference between baseline and treatment 
efficiencies for each session, and then comparing the average differences to zero by treatment 
type.14
 In testing the one-sided alternative that average efficiency is greater under the treatment 
environment than it is under the baseline environment, we find compelling evidence that each 
non-baseline treatment does in fact improve upon the average baseline efficiency.  One-sided 
exact p-values for each treatment are provided in Table 2; these correspond to a one-sided 
application of Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test. 
 
Table 2: P-values from One-Sided Tests that Average Efficiency Gain Exceeds Zero 
Treatment p-value 
Baseline 0.59380 
Chat 0.03125 
Bargaining 0.03125 
Auction 0.03125 
Optimal Fee 0.03125 
  
 Individual tests conform to a priori expectations, finding strong evidence of efficiency 
gains under every non-baseline treatment.  For its part, the repeated baseline treatment shows no 
evidence of an efficiency gain, which helps to mitigate concerns that repeated play or sequence 
effects may be driving experimental results. 
When performing many simultaneous tests, there is always a concern that some rejections 
may result from random variation alone.15  Thus, when attempting to draw inferences from the 
combined results of many individual tests, it is sometimes prudent to check whether conclusions 
differ under stronger rejection rules than simple per-test rejections.  A common technique is to 
use a test which controls of the family-wise error rate, defined as the probability of even a single 
                                                          
14  Within-session comparisons exploit pairing of baseline and treatment environments within each session to help 
mitigate the consequences of potentially unobserved heterogeneity. 
15  For example, consider running 20 statistically independent tests at the 0.05 level, and suppose all null hypotheses 
are in fact true.  Since the probability of a false rejection is 5% in each individual test, we can expect one false 
rejection out of the 20 tests performed.  In fact, the probability of at least one false rejection is 1 – (0.95)20, or 64%. 
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false rejection among k simultaneous tests.16  For these data, a joint test of all non-baseline 
treatment environments leads to the same conclusion---that all non-baseline treatments lead to 
efficiency gains over the baseline---at the family-wise 0.1 level.17
 Having determined that all examined solutions increase efficiency over the baseline, the 
next logical question is how much of an improvement each solution affords.  To address this 
question, Figure 4 illustrates 95% confidence intervals for average efficiency gains under each 
treatment environment.18
 
 
Figure 4. 95% Confidence Intervals for Average Efficiency Gain by Treatment 
 
 Confidence intervals for the average efficiency gain under each solution vary 
considerably in both breadth and location.  It is interesting that a 95% confidence interval on the  
optimal fee solution includes as much as a 25% average efficiency gain over the baseline 
environment—corresponding to approximately 100% efficiency under this solution.  Outcomes 
under the chat treatment are sufficiently variable that a 95% confidence interval contains both 
zero efficiency gains, and gains of nearly 20%. Clearly, we cannot use these data to speak with 
much precision about the average efficiency gain resulting from non-binding communication.  
This is not terribly surprising: chat logs reveal that some groups manage to establish loose 
                                                          
16   Note that this is a very conservative test that is appropriate when a false rejection of the null can have serious 
consequences, e.g. when it means administering a drug when it actually has no beneficial effect. 
17  The reported rejection corresponds to a sequential Bonferroni-type test described by Hochberg (1988). 
18  Confidence intervals are constructed by inversion of Wilcoxon's signed-rank test.  Note that these confidence 
intervals are analogous to two-sided tests, while the hypotheses tested above are one-sided. 
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behavioral norms or some degree of social responsibility, while other groups fail to establish 
such norms, and chat devolves into a series of complaints and frustrations.   
 
Result 3:   Average efficiencies differ between some treatment environments. 
 
 Given that all the solutions considered in this paper do increase allocative efficiency to 
varying degrees, the next logical inquiry is whether we can say anything about which ones work 
better than others.  To address this question, we rely on between-session variation in comparing 
average efficiencies across our various treatment environments.  At the most fundamental level, 
the question is whether we can be certain of any difference between treatments in the first place.  
Casual inspection of Figure 4 strongly suggests we can, and formal statistical tests agree: we 
reject the possibility that efficiency gains are equal across treatments at every reasonable level of 
significance.19
 Of course, the interesting question is not whether the treatment effects of the various 
solutions differ, but how they differ.  To address this point, we conduct a multiple comparisons 
test of all pair-wise contrasts between treatments using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.20  
Table 3 summarizes inferences gained from each comparison: reported p-values are exact. 
 
Table 3: P-values from Two-Sided Tests of Common Location. 
Comparison p-value 
Bargaining vs Chat 1.00000 
Chat vs Auction 0.09524 
Bargaining vs Auction 0.00794 
Auction vs Optimal Fee 0.00794 
Chat vs Optimal Fee 0.00794 
Bargaining vs Optimal Fee 0.00794 
  
 
                                                          
19  Kruskal-Wallis tests for equality of location yield asymptotic p-values of less than 0.005 whether or not the 
repeated baseline treatment is included in the comparison. 
20  The intuition behind this test is easily illustrated.  For example, if all 5 observations under one treatment are lower 
than all 5 observations under another, then of the “10 take 5” = 252 ways of permuting these numbers, only 2 of 
these (all 5 greater under one treatment and all 5 less under one treatment) are as extreme or more extreme that what 
was observed.  Under the null, the chances of this are 2/252 = 0.00794, as shown by the bottom 4 rows of Table 3. 
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 Specific conclusions drawn from this family of tests are provided in the next three results.  
As noted previously, the more statistical tests one conducts, the more false rejections one can be 
expected to produce.  This is never a problem on a per-comparison basis, but it can sometimes 
muddy conclusions drawn from looking comprehensively at the results of a family of tests.  For 
completeness, we comment on how conclusions differ under the stronger requirement of 
controlling the family-wise error rate, where appropriate. 
  
Result 4: The optimal fee treatment yields higher average efficiency than any other treatment 
environment. 
 
 In terms of simply increasing efficiency over the status quo, the optimal fee solution is a 
clear winner.  This conclusion stands whether or not one chooses to take the more conservative 
approach of controlling the family-wise error rates.21  The observation of nearly 100% efficiency 
in this treatment is, of course, consistent with economic theory. Since the price of irrigation is 
fixed at a level that causes all farmers to internalize the social opportunity cost of the water, even 
a small dose of individual rationality should suffice to affect a socially optimal allocation. 
Unfortunately, the practicality of this solution to the common-pool resource problem is 
limited.  There is no reason to expect an optimal fee would be obvious in a typical policy-making 
setting, particularly when users have incentives to report valuations selectively and to lobby for 
lower fees.  Because a fee-based solution could fail quite miserably if the fee were set at the 
wrong price, difficulty in determining the proper fee may translate into a great decrease in 
practical efficacy in many settings. 
 
Result 5:  The Auction treatment yields higher average efficiency than either the Chat or 
Bargaining environments.  
 
 Because an auction solution uses a market mechanism to “discover” the optimal fee, it is 
not surprising that it should closely follow the optimal fee treatment in terms of average 
                                                          
21  The Optimal Fee treatment is concluded to provide higher average efficiency than any other non-baseline 
treatment when using the Hochberg algorithm to control the family-wise error rate at the 0.025 level. 
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efficiency.  Efficiency of the auction treatment clearly surpasses that of the bargaining 
environment, and superiority of the auction over the chat environment is also evident, albeit with 
a less impressive p-value.  We draw the same conclusion when controlling family-wise error 
rates at the 0.2 level, but fail to reject that average efficiency is the same under chat and auction 
treatments at lower levels of the family-wise error rate.22
 
Result 6:  There is little evidence that bilateral bargaining results in a greater average efficiency 
than simply allowing participants to communicate in a non-binding way. 
 
 Because externalities are fundamentally problems of property rights, the Coase theorem 
argues that private bargaining in the context of well-defined property rights should result in 
socially optimal allocations.  By contrast, allowing farmers to engage in non-binding 
communication without the ability to make and enforce contracts provides no theoretical 
argument for an efficiency gain over selfish behavior.  While we would have expected the 
bargaining treatment environment to exhibit greater average efficiency than the chat treatment, 
the data fail to support this claim. 
 One possible explanation for the dismal performance of private bargaining is the 
potentially serious obstacle of transactions costs, which are assumed away in the Coase theorem.  
Although property rights are well defined and there are no explicit transactions costs in this 
treatment, a downstream farmer has to make multiple contracts with upstream farmers in order to 
insure water availability.  With no centralized coordinator, the difficulty of forming an 
appropriate menu of contracts can represent a substantial implicit transactions cost.23  There is 
also a free-riding problem, since various farmers may benefit from contracts to which they are 
                                                          
22   The auction treatment environment is concluded to provide higher average efficiency than either the bargaining 
or chat treatments when using the Hochberg (1988) algorithm to control the family-wise error rate at the 0.2 level.  
At lower levels, there is not sufficient evidence to statistically distinguish the auction and chat environments.  
Although 0.2 is higher than contemporary standards of “statistical significance” as applied to individual hypothesis 
tests, it is reasonable among tests controlling the family-wise error rate.  Intuitively, rejection at this level 
corresponds to allowing for no more than a 20% chance of experiencing even a single false rejection among all six 
comparisons conducted in Table 3. 
23 A strikingly similar result is found in a network formation experiment. Connecting to the network is a contribution 
to the public good. If each player (node) connected to its nearest neighbor(s), players would enjoy higher earnings. If 
all players didn’t connect, the players that had connected would suffer a loss. The coordination problem created 
enough of a barrier that no “chain networks” could form in the laboratory (Deck and Johnson, 2001).  
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not a party: in the words of an ID 6 participant during the chat phase of bargaining, “I would sign 
with you player 1 [ID 1], but the water doesn’t seem to get to me anyway.”   
IV. Conclusion 
 This paper was inspired by the rich array of commons problems studied by Elinor Ostrom 
and her collaborators.  One lesson of these field studies is that there is not necessarily a “tragedy” 
in common-pool resource environments.  The laboratory results reported here are intended to 
compare various solutions to a commons problem in the context of a sequential structure that 
arises naturally in settings with a unidirectional flow.  Results suggest that the commons problem 
of inefficient resource allocations can be mitigated by the introduction of proper social 
institutions or government intervention. 
In the setting we investigate, there exists a unique optimal fee, the imposition of which 
causes full internalization of all usage externalities.  Unsurprisingly, experimental results show 
exogenous imposition of this fee corresponds to nearly 100%, efficiency.  A solution relying on a 
uniform price auction for water permits is not as efficient, but the difference appears relatively 
small.  The advantage of an auction approach solution is that the usage fee is endogenously 
discovered, which is of great practical importance when the optimal fee is not generally known a 
priori.   
When property rights are well defined and contracts are binding the Coase Theorem 
suggests that private bargaining should result in optimal allocations, at least in the absence of 
significant transactions costs.  The bargaining treatment of the experiment implements binding 
bilateral contracts without explicit negotiation costs.  Because contracts are constrained to be 
bilateral, however, participants may have to arrange sequences of contracts in order to ensure 
water flow to the fertile downstream fields; this source of complexity may represent an implicit 
transactions cost.  Moreover, there is a free-riding problem in the sense that participants located 
between two parties to a contract may take the water that the upstream person agrees not to use.  
In this setting, we find bargaining has no more effect than a somewhat mild social-pressure 
treatment that permits participants to talk to each other in a chat room and observe others’ 
decisions (the bargaining treatment also permitted a chat phase and social observation). 
An interesting extension may be to revise the bargaining environment to allow for direct, 
bilateral trade of water units.  For example, instead of contracting to reduce an upstream user’s 
total water usage, a downstream user might simply “buy” a unit of water from the upstream 
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user—circumventing both contractual complexity and free-riding problems.  While this 
alternative specification seems likely to achieve greater average efficiency, its practical relevance 
is unclear.    
It is well known from Ostrom’s original studies (and a large subsequent literature on 
voluntary contributions with punishments) that direct punishment opportunities can often solve a 
commons problem.  An alternative extension of our experiment would be to determine whether 
there is also a political solution in which participants vote on irrigation restrictions or usage fees, 
with fee revenues being distributed to participants in some manner.   
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Appendix: Data on Average Efficiencies by Session 
 
Session Name Avg. Efficiency: 
Rounds 1-3 
Avg. Efficiency: 
Rounds 4-6 
Treatment 
Rounds 4-6 
wex21 74.290 76.912 Chat 
wex22 77.726 79.209 Chat 
wep11 77.723 92.595 Chat 
wep30 77.423 95.752 Chat 
wex2 76.678 88.616 Chat 
wex16 80.852 90.604 Bargaining 
wex17 76.450 87.743 Bargaining 
wex18 78.248 88.867 Bargaining 
wex19 74.190 86.293 Bargaining 
wex20 75.289 87.575 Bargaining 
wep10 74.190 91.718 Auction 
wep17 76.504 97.349 Auction 
wep18 84.597 95.267 Auction 
wex1 75.289 97.301 Auction 
wex3 77.492 92.852 Auction 
wex6 76.279 98.018 Optimal Fee 
wex7 75.408 99.456 Optimal Fee 
wex8 76.797 98.582 Optimal Fee 
wex9 74.190 00.000 Optimal Fee 
wex10 74.190 98.342 Optimal Fee 
wex11 79.635 75.670 Baseline 
wex12 76.971 76.996 Baseline 
wex13 79.809 77.754 Baseline 
wex14 74.190 75.670 Baseline 
wex15 76.975 80.535 Baseline 
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